Recent events have highlighted the potential importance of nonlinear effects of fiscal variables (notably debt and deficits) on interest rates: While in times when government solvency is not a concern the standard crowding-out effects are of moderate magnitude, in times when default risk becomes an issue the interest rate effects can become very large. This paper provides new evidence on the magnitude of these effects. For the case when default risk is not a concern, it uses an arbitrage-free term structure model to estimate the dynamic effects of fiscal policy shocks on interest rates along the entire maturity spectrum. For the case when default risk becomes a concern (thereby violating a central assumption of the term structure model), I present evidence based on EMU government bond spread regressions on time-varying effects of national fiscal policies on spreads as well as the time-varying sensitivity of yield spreads to international risk aversion as a function of the state of fiscal policy.
Introduction
Much ink has been spilled on the topic of the relationship between fiscal policy, especially between government debt, deficits or government spending, and interest rates. A large body of empirical studies documents that an increase in government deficits or debt has either statistically insignificant effects on interest rates, or raises them by a statistically significant, but economically modest amount. As so often, most of this evidence is based on postwar U.S. data.
As recent events in the euro area, however, have made abundantly clear, there are situations in which interest rates react very sensitively to fiscal policy changes. The purpose of this paper is to study the recent empirical evidence. The main theme that emerges is that there are times and circumstances in which the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates can be very large indeed. These are presumably times when sovereign default risk becomes an issue. When no risk of sovereign default is perceived, the effects of government debt or deficits on interest rates seem to be significant, but modest. The paper develops models for either of these two situations and then asks what circumstances, including fiscal ones, trigger concerns about default risk in financial markets.
The paper brings together ideas and techniques from several different strands of literature. The first part of the paper focusses on evidence from the U.S., mostly prior to the onset of the financial crisis. It draws on the structural VAR literature to measure the effects (on interest rates, among other variables) of fiscal policies, as well as on the literature on affine term structure models to separate out the effects on expectations of future interest rates from risk premia. This part focusses on the U.S. because it uses techniques that are appropriate only in the absence of default risk and because it requires a rich set of zerocoupon government bond yields that are not available for a sufficiently long period and of sufficient quality for all euro area countries that are studied later. In hindsight, it is difficult to avoid the impression that default risk was underpriced prior to 2008. For example, the average spread of 10-year Greek government bonds over German ones was 25 basis points; for Italian bonds it was about the same magnitude, for Portugese 15 basis points. Regardless of how one views the period of compressed EMU government bond spreads that lasted until early March of 2008, it is important to ask whether we can identify a threshold or estimate the nonlinear process by which the interest rate effects of fiscal policy become amplified. In section 3 I develop one such model, but clearly on this issue much work remains to be done.
Fiscal policy and interest rates in the U.S. prior and during the crisis
This section provides evidence on the interest rate effects of fiscal policy in a situation where it is plausible to assume that default risk was perceived by investors to be negligible. • There is strong evidence against the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.
Therefore it is of interest to decompose yields into risk-neutral (expectations) components and risk premia, and to ask how fiscal policy affects interest rates, whether mostly through changes in expected future short-term interest rates or through changes in risk prices.
• We can study how yields at all maturities (not only at one maturity as in reduced-form regressions) respond to fiscal policies while simultaneously imposing the assumption of no-arbitrage, which seems plausible in as deep and liquid a market as that for U.S.
Treasury securities.
• By using a VAR as law of motion, the results can also be related to the literature of based on samples ending before the onset of the crisis and those including the crisis period.
Despite the extreme deterioration in the U.S. fiscal outlook, long-term yields have remained low presumably because of safe-haven demand for Treasury securities. To estimate the effect of the increase in government debt on interest rates, it is therefore important to quantify the extent to which (presumably temporary) safe-haven demand has held down yields.
An affine term structure model with fiscal factors
The model used to estimate the dynamic effects of fiscal policy shocks consists of a reducedform description of the relationships between major macroeconomic and fiscal variables, and a specification of the stochastic discount factor that ensures that pricing of bonds at various maturities is arbitrage-free. Two key assumptions underlying this pricing framework are the bonds don't pay coupons, and that they are free of default risk.
Specifically, let
denote the state vector comprising the detrended short rater t (where the meaning of "detrended" will be explained shortly), a demeaned fiscal policy measuref t , detrended inflatioñ π t , a measure q t of real activity relative to potential, and trend inflationπ t . The first four of these variables are assumed to follow a VAR(2), whereas trend inflation is assumed to follow an exogenous random walk:
Trend inflationπ t is a latent factor, which, however, will be tightly constrained in the estimation by a survey-based measure of long-horizon inflation expectations. The remaining four factors are observable macro variables.
In specifying the stochastic discount factor that prices bonds at different maturities, I
am following the large literature of affine term structure models (e.g. Duffee, 2002) . Let
denote the Radon-Nikodym derivative that converts the data-generating to the risk-neutral probability measure, such that
where E rn t denotes expectation under the risk-neutral measure and λ t are the prices associated with the macroeconomic risks. These risks are given by the (as yet to be identified) fundamental innovations t , which are assumed to be i.i.d. standard normal. The reducedform innovations u t have covariance matrix ω.
A key assumption is the specification of the prices of risk λ t as a general linear function of the states:
This specification plays an important role in enabling the model to explain the observed failures of the expectations hypothesis (Dai and Singleton, 2002) and to forecast yields (Duffee, 2002) . I follow Dai and Philippon (2006) in assuming that the stochastic discount factor depends only on current innovations t , but that the prices of risk can depend on both current and lagged states. Therefore λ t is a 5 × 1 vector and λ 1 a 5 × 10 matrix. Certain other assumptions are being imposed to conserve on the otherwise very large number of parameters to be estimated; details are provided in the appendix. It should be noted that the flexibility provided by the general specification (2) comes at the cost that it is unclear how to generate this specification from preferences of a representative investor.
Besides the VAR specification (1) for the states, the stochastic discount factor and the prices of risk (2), the model is completed by a specification for the one-period nominal risk-free interest rate
where I assume that y 1 t loads only on current states x t . 3 As shown in the appendix, the model then implies that the yield on a nominal zero-coupon bond with n periods to maturity is a linear function
where the coefficients a n , b n are determined recursively.
The use of survey expectations and fiscal projections in estimation
The parameters of the term structure model developed above, i.e. the VAR parameters φ 1 , φ 2 and the unique elements of the covariance matrix ω, the parameters δ 0 and δ 1 of the short-rate equation , and the parameters λ 0 and λ 1 of the risk price specification are estimated by maximum likelihood. Because the term structure model implies the exact linear relationships (4) between the states and the yields, with k states and only one latent factor it is necessary to add measurement error to at least k − 1 yields to avoid stochastic singularity. The n-period yield is therefore assumed to equal
By contrast, the macroeconomic variables are assumed to be observed without error. Observed inflation is simply the sum of trend inflation and detrended inflation,
where the mean of trend inflation equals that of observed inflation, whereas the observed short rate r t equals the sum of the mean real short-term interest rate, trend inflation and the detrended short-term real rate: r t =rr +r t +π t . Finally, the observed fiscal measure is equal to its mean and the deviation from that mean: f t =f +f t . The time series of the With these assumptions, the state space model consists of the transition equation given by the VAR (1) and a measurement equation
in which the vector of observables is given by
where N denotes the longest maturity included in estimation.
Identifying fiscal policy shocks
The major challenge in assessing the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates is the endogeneity of fiscal policy measures like spending, revenues or the deficit to other economic variables and shocks. In Laubach (2009) I tried to overcome this problem in the context of reduced-form regressions by focussing on the effects of long-horizon (5-year-ahead) projections of deficits, debt, spending and revenues on proxies for expectations at the same horizon of long-term interest rates. The implicit assumption in this strategy is that changes in fiscal policy measures, especially the deficit/GDP ratio, projected at long horizons reflect exclusively exogenous changes to fiscal policy.
Given that the transition equation of the state vector is a VAR, I am instead following the methodology developed in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended in Perotti (2004) for identifying exogenous shocks to government spending and taxes. In short, the key assumption underlying their strategy is that within the quarter, the fiscal authorities are not able to respond in a discretionary manner to economic news. Hence, the only contemporaneous responses are those implied by the "automatic fiscal stabilizers," i.e. the elasticities of spending and taxes with respect to the macro variables (output, prices, interest rates) included in the VAR. The relations between the VAR's reduced-form residuals u for log real taxes τ and log real spending g and their structural shocks ε can then be written as
The elasticities η can be calibrated from institutional information on tax codes and benefits rules, allowing to identify the structural shocks.
Since taxes and spending are not included separately in the VAR but only through the surplus f t = τ t − g t , I follow Dai and Philippon (2006) and calculate the structural "surplus shocks" by using η f,q = η τ,q −η g,q etc. To provide some additional information on properties of the VAR, below I also report impulse response functions to a "monetary policy shock" that is identified in the usual recursive manner by assuming that the funds rate responds contemporaneously to all variables in the VAR, but that fiscal policy, inflation and real activity do not respond within the quarter to r t . More details on the calibration of the elasticities η is provided in the appendix. 
Results

Estimation
Despite the imposition of restrictions especially on the risk price parameters λ, the model is fairly highly parameterized, with a total of 78 parameters to be estimated. 4 As in other studies in this literature, I therefore rely on finding good starting values for the VAR parameters φ 1 , φ 2 and ω and δ 1 and only then estimate the price-of-risk and other parameters. 5 A natural way of assessing the model's properties is the in-sample fit of the yields. The small size of the measurement error standard deviations is remarkable in light of the common finding that pure macro-factor term structure models tend to produce standard deviations on the order of 50 basis points (e.g. Mönch, 2008) . Although strictly speaking the model does include one latent factor, it is important to point out that this factor is tighly linked to an observable series, the long-horizon survey expectations of inflation. As shown in Figure 3 , the latent factor (the solid blue line) follows the survey expectations The role of the CBO projections in estimating the model is illustrated in Figure 4 Nonetheless, including the CBO projections helps to impart substantially more variability Figure 4 for the 5-year horizon).
The interest rate effects of fiscal shocks
Figures 5 and 6 present the main results of this section, i.e the impulse responses of the states and of yields at various maturities to a surplus shock and, for comparison with the large literature on measuring monetary policy, also to a funds rate shock. 7 As shown in the upper right panel of Figure 5 , an exogenous fiscal tightening of 1% of GDP is followed by a persistent deficit for the following twelve quarters. According to the VAR, the exogenous fiscal contraction leads to immediate, sharp declines in real activity and inflation, and these declines in turn drive the budget balance into negative territory through the automatic stabilizers. In response to the declines in real activity and inflation, the short rate, shown in the upper left panel, declines by about one percentage point for Combining Figures 5 and 6 , it is apparent that the mechanism by which exogenous fiscal tightening leads to a reduction in yields is by way of inducing a sharp contraction in real activity and inflation. The effects of exogenous fiscal policy measures on real activity are of course a subject of much recent controversy. The regression coefficient of detrended log real GDP to the real activity measure used here (the CFNAI) is about 1.25. Thus, the response tightening is an increase in debt/GDP, yet this effect is not captured by the VAR analysis.
As mentioned before, inclusion of a debt-accumulation identity is not straightforward as the linearity of the law of motion of the state vector is necessary for the model's ability to derive closed-form bond-pricing formulas.
Fiscal policy and interest rate spreads in Europe before and since 2008
Developments in yield spreads between EMU government bonds since early 2008 have been rather dramatic. Figure 7 shows some of the data used in this section. These are yields of the currently outstanding government bond closest to 10-year maturity minus their German counterpart.
Although it would in principle be desirable to have the same framework explaining yields whether sovereign default risk is negligible or not -a key factor behind the dramatic rise in the spreads -there are several reasons why the arbitrage-free term structure model developed in the previous section would be difficult to apply to euro area yield spreads.
First, while extensions of the framework to the case of bonds with default risk exist (e.g.
Duffie and Singleton, 1999), they would be challenging to estimate on the relatively short post-EMU sample that is apparently subject to a regime change in 2008. Second, such models are data-demanding, requiring zero-coupon yields on government bonds for sufficiently many maturities for all the countries considered (for an application to three EMU member countries see e.g. Monfort and Renne, 2010) . In this section I therefore pursue a more limited exercise in the spirit of the existing literature on EMU government bond spreads discussed in the introduction.
Focusing on spreads of government bond yields between other EMU member countries and Germany, instead of trying to model the levels of the individual interest rate series (as in Faini 2006 ) has the advantage that we do not need to take a stand on the determinants of euro area interest rates, but can focus directly on country-specific influences.
The relation between EMU government spreads and fiscal policy
Does the level of a country's deficit-to-GDP ratio or debt-to-GDP ratio, or both, affect the interest rate spread that it has to pay on a debt instrument of a given maturity over a comparable German yield? In the time series, the answer seems to be cleary "no". Consider the OECD's projection of the surplus/GDP ratio. 9 10 Although the number of observations to be fitted at each date is small, the fit of these regressions is nonetheless surprisingly good. Of the 16 regressions, only three produce an adjusted R 2 of less than 0.5, whereas 11 produce an adjusted R 2 between 0.7 and 0.9. Figure   8 illustrates the fit of four of these regressions by plotting the fitted value on the horizontal against the actual spreads on the vertical axis. If all points were lying on the 90 • line, the R 2 would be 1.
How can the (presumably) poor explanatory power of the fiscal variables for spreads in the time series be reconciled with the very good fit of these variables in the cross-section?
The main explanation, as shown in Figure 9 , is significant time variation in the magnitude hence the results are based on only nine countries. 9 The use of the OECD's projection for the total instead of the primary surplus raises the risk of reverse causality, especially for countries with very high debt/GDP levels. In future work I hope to obtain the OECD's projections for the primary surplus/GDP. 10 As presumably the ultimate object of interest is some measure of fiscal sustainability, I have also considered regressions in which the product of the projected surplus/GDP and debt/GDP is included. 
A common-components framework
The regression results presented in the previous subsection suggest that, even before the start of the period of high and volatile EMU spreads, fiscal variables did explain EMU government bond spreads, only that the spreads demanded to compensate for different deficit and debt levels were tiny. An important implication of these results is that one and the same combination of deficit/GDP and debt/GDP would nowadays demand a higher spread than prior to the onset of the financial crisis. The recent sharp increase in spreads thus reflects not only a deterioration in countries' fiscal position, but also a higher price for bearing a given amount of risk. One may therefore want to disentangle the changes in spreads due to variation in some common factor from those due to changes in the countryspecific fiscal positions.
Previous studies (e.g. Manganelli and Wolswijk) have emphasized the importance of To illustrate recent changes in the sensitivity of spreads to changes in risk aversion, Table 1 reports results from regressing each country's spread on a constant and the spread • November 13, 2009 until the most recent observation: The period during which the prospect of sovereign default was at the center of attention.
For the first sample, for all but France the adjusted R 2 is 65% or higher, suggesting (in line with Codogno et al.) that the common component of "international risk aversion" was the main driver. This result is only slightly weaker for the second sample, but (as in Ejsing and Lemke) the slope coefficient estimates β, which in both samples are highly significant, rise dramatically -in many cases by a factor of about 10. In the third sample the relationship between the common risk factor and EMU bond spreads breaks down, suggesting the emerging predominance of country-specific factors.
To summarize, the results presented in this section suggest a framework for modelling EMU government bond spreads that features (i) time-varying risk aversion (an imperfectly observed common component), (ii) loadings on this common component that are functions of country characteristics (e.g. debt/GDP, deficit/GDP) as well as (iii) other country-specific effects. 11 While the nonlinear effect, that a deterioration in the fiscal position amplifies the sensitivity of the spread to a given (potentially exogenous) change in risk aversion, seems to be empirically important, it will be difficult to embed such a nonlinearity into a more formal dynamic model of arbitrage-free bond pricing as discussed in the previous section.
Before concluding, it should be noted that identifying the risk inherent in a sovereign bond with traditional measures such as the debt/GDP and deficit/GDP ratio has become more problematic due to the massive expansion of (explicit or implicit) contingent liabilities However, results proved to be very sensitive to whether the model was estimated in level form (as above) or in difference form, and generally lead to time variation in the βs completely explaining the variation in spreads. I leave this for future research.
B The data
• Quarterly data, sample 70:1 to 07:4.
• Fama-Bliss zero-coupon yields 1, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 quarters.
• Funds rate r t , GDP deflator inflation π t , CFNAI q t .
• To use CBO projections, fiscal measures are federal sector. Use federal govt net lending from the NIPAs.
• Spliced series of long-horizon inflation expectations from FRB/US (treated as expectations of average inflation 5-10 years ahead).
• CBO projections 3 and 5 FY ahead (budget concepts close enough to NIPA govt net lending).
